Concerns about the potential for a national security threat posed by the Chinese networking concern Huawei have been simmering at a low intensity for some time. They burst out into the full glare of publicity today with the release of a report by the House Intelligence Committee saying that Huawei and another Chinese telecom-equipment concern, ZTE, pose sufficient security risks that government agencies should avoid buying their equipment. 关于中国电信网络提供商华为技术有限公司(Huawei Technologies Co.)有可能对美国国家安全性构成威胁的忧虑早已不温不火地持续了一段时间。如今，由于美国众议院情报委员会公布的一份报告，此类忧虑急遽加剧并沦为公众注目的焦点。
这份报告称之为，华为和另一家中国电信设备公司中兴通讯股份有限公司(ZTE Corp., 全称:中兴通讯)对美国国家安全性包含了风险，为此政府机构应当防止出售这两家公司的设备。There arent a lot of specifics to get excited about in the 52-page report, though there are presumably some items of interest in classified portions of the report not released to the public. Huawei has had a difficult time showing to the satisfaction of Western sensibilities that its ties to Chinas Peoples Liberation Army are severed. If ordered, the thinking goes, Huawei gear could be turned into a valuable espionage tool in the event of war with the U.S. or another country. 这份长达52页的报告中并没获取很多有一点激动的明确信息，不过，报告中并未向公众公布的保密部分可能会有一些让人饶有兴趣的东西。华为指出自己与中国人民解放军的关系早已解除的希望仍然无法让西方人失望。
美国国会指出，如果采购华为的设备，在中国与美国或其他国家激战的时候，这些设备有可能沦为最重要的间谍工具。The concerns on the part of U.S. lawmakers and the national security establishment are certainly valid, but not for the reasons you think. While Chinese actors have certainly been among the most active when it comes to attacking the networks of large U.S. corporations and stealing their secrets, the U.S. and its allies fret about letting Huawei in because they know from their own experience how imported electronics can be turned into a weapon of espionage and outright sabotage. 美国议员的忧虑和有关国家安全性的众说纷纭毫无疑问是正式成立的，但原因并非你所想要的那样。
尽管在反击美国大型公司的网络和盗取这些公司的机密方面，中国参与者毫无疑问归属于最活跃的一群，美国及其盟友不愿让华为转入美国是因为他们自己的经验告诉他他们，进口的电子设备可以沦为展开间谍和破坏活动的武器。Remember that it was intelligence agencies of the U.S., in partnership with Israel, that turned deep knowledge of the numerous variants of Microsofts Windows operating system combined with specialized knowledge of industrial control systems to create the Stuxnet worm that damaged the Iranian nuclear research program. Later discoveries included other U.S.-Israeli cyber weapons called Flame and Gauss. Taken together, they amount to evidence that the countries had mounted a less-than-covert military campaign against Iran that could in time have significant unintended consequences. 人们应当忘记，正是美国的情报机构与以色列合作，凭借对微软公司Windows操作系统各种版本的了解理解以及对工业控制系统的专业知识，才建构了蠕虫病毒震网(Stuxnet)，并利用这种病毒破坏了伊朗的核研究项目。人们后来还找到了美国和以色列生产的其他网络武器，如Flame和Gauss。所有这些证据指出，这两个国家早已发动了针对伊朗的不那么不为人知的军事行动，这些行动最后有可能引起始料未及的后果。
Prior efforts include a largely forgotten 1982 campaign of electronic sabotage against the natural gas pipeline being built by the Soviet Union that caused so large an explosion that U.S. military forces briefly thought it was an early sign of a nuclear attack. The episode was documented in the book At the Abyss: An Insiders History of the Cold War by Thomas Reed, the late former secretary of the Air Force under President Reagan. 人们很有可能早已忘了1982年再次发生的针对苏联天然气管道展开的电子设备毁坏行动，这次行动引起了大规模的发生爆炸，以至于美国军队一时间以为这是核攻击的早期信号。这个情节被记录在了《在深渊：一名知情者描写的世界大战史》(At the Abyss: An Insider’s History of the Cold War)一书中，作者是胞弟的里根时代前空军部长里德(Thomas Reed)。Another incident, this one not as well documented but the subject of a great deal of informed speculation, concerns a 2007 Israeli air strike against what was at the time a suspected nuclear weapons research facility in Syria. A report by the IEEE Spectrum the following year traced reports that a French chip company that supplied the manufacturer of Syrian radar defense gear included a kill switch that allowed Israeli bombers to carry out their attack undetected. 另一起事件则没被很好地记录下来，不过这件事也引起了诸多消息灵通人士的猜测。
2007年以色列空军攻击了当时被猜测是核武器研究机构的叙利亚的一处设施。第二年，《IEEE波谱杂志》(IEEE Spectrum)的一篇报导跟踪到的消息表明，一家法国芯片公司获取给叙利亚的雷达防卫设备中包括一个“截断电源”(kill switch)，使叙利亚无法监测到以色列轰炸机正在继续执行的攻击活动。
So its not from out of nowhere that such national security concerns arise about a Chinese telecom concern. 因此，担忧中国的一家电信公司有可能威胁国家安全性并非空穴来风。One fundamental failure of all this official hand-wringing is that it neglects the fact that many if not most of the components, with the exception of certain higher-value chips like those from Intel, are manufactured in China. Cisco Systems and Juniper Networks in the U.S., Alcatel-Lucent in France and Ericsson in Sweden, all use Chinese-made parts and carry out at least some portion of the final assembly of their equipment in China. 美国官方对国家安全性威胁的忧虑不存在一处根本性的疏失，那就是它忽略了这样一个事实，即除英特尔(Intel)芯片等某些价值更高的芯片外，很多、甚至可以说道大部分电信设备组件都是在中国生产的。美国的思科系统(Cisco Systems)和瞻博网络(Juniper Networks)、法国的阿尔卡特朗讯(Alcatel-Lucent)和瑞典的爱立信(Ericsson)都用于中国生产的零部件，并且设备的最后装配最少有部分是在中国展开的。
Huawei certainly hasnt done itself any favors. While its most senior U.S. employee described the company as an open book in a surprisingly short segment on CBSs 60 Minutes last night (see the video below), its founder and chief executive, Ren Zhengfei, has never sat for an interview with a Western media outlet. And the precise ownership of the companys shares are murky. U.S. regulators have prevented it from making certain acquisitions, and in Australia it was blocked from bidding on portions of a project to build a national broadband Internet network. 华为毫无疑问也没给自己带给任何助益。尽管在周日晚间CBS电视台“60分钟”(60 Minutes)节目一个胆怯较短的环节中，华为级别最低的美国员工将该公司叙述为一个“让人一目了然的公司”，但该公司创始人兼任首席执行长任正非却未曾拒绝接受过西方媒体机构的专访。
此外，该公司股份的清楚所有权也晦暗未知。美国监管机构制止其展开某些并购，在澳大利亚，华为被禁令竞标国家宽带网络建设项目的部分工作。It hasnt gotten to be the worlds largest telecom equipment concern for nothing. Wireless phone networks in Africa rely heavily on inexpensive gear sold by Huawei. There are suspicions about its dealings in this area too, though they are mostly economic. Huawei has a history of undercutting Western rivals in competitive bids by as much as 5 percent to 15 percent, raising suspicion that it is the benefactor of state-sponsored subsidies. However, its also to the benefit of these rivals to stoke the national security concerns as much as possible. 华为沦为世界上最令人担忧的电信设备公司自有原因。
非洲的手机网络相当严重倚赖华为销售的低价设备。有人还对华为在非洲的业务回应猜测，不过大部分是经济方面的猜测。华为历年来在竞标时开价比西方竞争对手最少可低5%至15%，这令人猜测该公司是政府补贴的受益者。不过，这些竞争对手也不会从尽量地为国家安全性忧虑推波助澜中取得益处。
All told, its not as though there is no reason to be suspicious of Huawei, if only because the U.S. and its allies know too well from their own actions in recent years about the potential for electronic espionage, surveillance and warfare. 总之，华为并非没什么有一点猜测的地方，美国及其盟友从近年来自身行动中就早已深刻理解到了有可能经常出现的电子间谍、侦查和战争。For its part, Huawei defended itself and attacked the report in a response today (read it in full here). The company said the committees report, an 11-month effort, failed to provide clear information or evidence to substantiate the legitimacy of the Committees concerns and appears to have been committed to a predetermined outcome and employs many rumors and speculations to prove non-existent accusations. 华为周一为自己展开申辩，在一份对此中对美国会报告展开了反攻。
该公司说道，委员会经过11个月的调查得出结论的报告并未获取具体信息或证据来证明委员会的忧虑是合理的，报告或许是在为预先原作的结论自圆其说，用于了很多传言和猜测来证明无端的指控。Without having read the classified portions of the report, which are said to contain more specifics - it mentions only vague instances of beaconing, which is intended to mean sending data back to China - its hard to argue with Huaweis position. 在未看见报告保密部分内容的情况下（据传还包括更加多下文），很难驳斥华为的立场。
报告只提及一些隐约的“信标”活动，“信标”活动所指的是向中国传到数据。Nor is it easy to dismiss the committees fears out of hand. Which brings us to the possible unintended result of all this: Might China respond with its own restrictions against U.S. telecom firms like Cisco and Juniper? Is this the first shot of a telecom trade war? Well see. 当然，我们也无法几乎忽视委员会的忧虑。这竟然我们有可能面对这样一种意想不到的结果：中国否有可能作出对此，针对思科和瞻博网络等美国电信公司发售容许措施？这否意味著一场电信贸易战打响了第一枪？我们将拭目以待。
If that happens, expect Cisco to be hurt more than Huawei. U.S. sales account for only 4 percent of its overall revenue, whereas Ciscos operations in Asia, the Pacific Rim and China account for more than 16 percent, and China was its second fastest-growing market in that region after Japan. 如果再次发生电信贸易战，预计思科将比华为更加伤势。美国销售额仅有占到华为总收入的4%，而亚洲、的环太平洋地区和中国业务却占到了思科总业务的16%以上。此外，中国是思科在该地区次于日本的增长速度第二大快的市场。
本文来源：ayx爱游戏体育-www.bzchangxin.com